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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the link between the economic conceptions of rationality and learning. Traditionally, most 
economists believe that learning is just a way for agents to become fully rational. But being fully rational cannot 
describe a process, for there is only one way to be rational in the economic sense of the term. Therefore, what 
economists have in mind is not learning itself but only the result of learning: “a fully rational agent”. As a 
consequence, “individuals are not really learning, they are only modifying their behaviour due to the information 
they gather”, Garrouste (2003). Heterodox rationality conceptions such as the Simonian model of bounded 
rationality seem more compatible with the idea of learning. Bounded rationality implies that agents may act 
differently to the same stimulus; it is therefore compatible with the idea of diversity, one of the foundations of the 
evolutionary logic. But following Simon, learning should not be considered as a creative process that allows a lot 
of diverse answers. On the contrary, for Simon, there is no subjectivity in behavior, but only a “complex 
behaviour” that reflects the “environmental complexity” (Simon 1996). This raises an important question: how 
can the Simonian conception of bounded rationality be made compatible with the idea of diverse forms of 
learning? Our paper aims to answer this question by showing how intentionality and identity, and more broadly 
Fransisco Varela’s “enaction” theory, can help to invent a concept of “rational learning” that is compatible with 
the idea of subjective (and diverse) agents. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the introduction of a long review devoted to learning in economics, Dosi, Marengo and 
Fagiolo wrote that «  learning […] is an ubiquitous characteristic of most economic and, 
generally, social environments, with the remarkable exception of those postulated by the most 
extreme forms of economic modelling, such as those assuming rational expectations or 
canonical game-theoretic equilibria” (Dosi et al. 2003, p. 3). Truly, if the notion of learning is 
essential to every study on human environments, for a long time, economists have been using it 
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with infinite caution. The study of learning did not appear as a priority and most of them would 
have been delighted to leave this question to psychology or other social sciences. To take the 
words of Lazaric et al. "Learning in itself does not interest economists, but it is its 
consequences or its economic expressions that do" (Lazaric et al. 1995, p. ix). 
But as economic sciences get closer to other social sciences, especially business, or when they 
try to go deeper into the psychological or behavioral foundations of the agents they study, it 
becomes more and more difficult to dismiss this question. In this regard, heterodox approaches 
based on Nelson and Winter (1982) seminal work were fast to acknowledge the necessity to 
take learning into account in evolutionary environments. 
This was not without consequences. Studying learning is indeed impossible without 
interrogating our rationality conceptions (Kirman and Salmon 1995). Aware of this difficulty, 
evolutionary economists have chosen to found their theory on the Simonian bounded 
rationality model instead of the perfect rationality model used in standard economic 
conceptions. But this strategy raised new difficulties. In the Simonian approach, learning is a 
pure adaptive process and comes down to the memorization of information on the 
environment. Two agents faced with the same environment will therefore learn the same thing 
and their behaviors will progressively converge. 
Unfortunately, this idea is contradictory with an evolutionary fundamental principle: the 
diversity of responses. As Stanley Metcalfe explicitly emphasizes, "What would kill the 
evolutionary argument stone dead would be if all units of selection adapted their behaviour in 
identical fashion to the appropriate signals. Then we would have uniform responses, no variety 
and no evolution" (Metcalfe 2005, p. 414). How, therefore, shall we council the evolutionary 
logic, which implies diverse agents with different behaviors, with a learning conception that, 
on the contrary, tends to make behaviors move toward a unique model? 
The goal of this paper is to answer this question by proposing a "post-Simonian" approach of 
rationality that is compatible with the idea of a subjective learning. To do so, we will develop 
the characteristics of a "creative" learning process, showing that the logic of learning is based 
on a conscious choice that may look like a "bet". Relying on Fransisco Varela’s approach of 
cognitive sciences, we will show that learning is not equivalent to acquiring a true information 
about the environment, but must be understood as the deepening of an individual coherence 
that stands at the interface between the world reality and the identity of learning organisms.   3
Our reasoning will follow three steps. The next section will briefly show that the notion of 
learning is not compatible with the idea of perfect rationality. Section 3 will be devoted to the 
study of the Simonian bounded rationality model and to its limits. At last, the fourth section 
will develop a new approach of the relation between behavior and identity that will allow us to 
propose a new learning model that will answer the difficulties we raised. 
 
2. Learning and perfect rationality 
If economists are interested in rationality models (and especially in perfect rationality models), 
it is because they are useful to establish what kind of decision an agent will take and what its 
behavior will be. In this regard, Walliser (2000, p.  72) describes as follow the three 
characteristics of rational decision models: 
1/ no social dynamic: The rational model implies that only individuals decide, without 
the influence of a group. As a consequence, the social network can be split up in a vast 
number of individual decision centres. 
2/ nor coherence neither complementarities in behaviors. This assumption implies that 
all actions of an agent can be divided into individual actions and can be analyzed by 
themselves. 
3/ the decision process is made up of three successive steps: i) information gathering; ii) 
deliberation; iii) implementation. 
However this model raises some specific difficulties for the study of learning. First, it cannot 
see learning as a collective or a social phenomenon. Yet, most learning theories are based on 
the capacity individuals have to imitate or to be influenced by others’ experience (see Simon’s 
(2005) “docility” concept or the “social learning” approach of Ellison and Fudenberg 1993). 
The second difficulty is raised by the second assumption of Walliser’s model, which postulates 
that the successive actions of an individual may be split up in independent units. However, a 
learning process implies a cumulative dimension that necessitates that coherence be maintained 
over time in behaviors and decisions. At last, the third difficulty comes with the hypothesis of a 
strict linearity between preferences and behavior. It prevents one from considering the 
eventually endogenous character of preferences.
2 
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Besides the criticisms that can be levelled against the standard decision model, one can wonder 
if the “perfect rationality” concept is adapted to any conception of learning. In fact, if agents 
are seen as perfectly rational, that is if they have a perfect knowledge of their environment, and 
if they enjoy an infinite computing capacity, we hardly see how (and what) they could still 
learn. 
Walliser (1995) distinguishes two types of rationality: on one hand the cognitive rationality 
assumes the appropriateness between the agent’s beliefs and the information it received. It is 
used to build the agent’s expectations. On the other hand the instrumental rationality assumes 
the appropriateness between the agent’s opportunities and its preferences. It is used to help the 
agent develop a strategy that matches its expectations. 
In the case where an individual has a perfect cognitive rationality and a perfect instrumental 
rationality, it is considered to be “substantially” rational. In Simon’s sense, that means “that 
behavior is objectively rational in relation to its total environment, including both present and 
future environment as the actor moves through time” (Simon 1986, p. 210). 
This kind of rationality brings us to a very specific form of learning that Walliser (1998) called 
“eductive process” (the expression is taken from Binmore 1987). In an eductive process, agents 
are perfectly informed about their environment and they can treat perfectly this information. As 
a consequence, each agent has a perfect and objective knowledge about the world, so that 
everyone shares the same knowledge and the same representation. This kind of process 
logically implies a perfect prediction about the world and about other agents’ behaviors. 
Everyone will therefore instantaneously be in equilibrium, without any dialogue, for they all 
follow the same representation.
3 
Is this rationality model compatible with the notion of learning? It depends on the conception 
we chose to adopt about learning. For Pierre Garrouste, the Walliserian eductive process means 
that learning is assimilated to a mere information gathering. As he emphasizes, in this kind of 
process “individuals are not really learning, they are only modifying their behavior due to the 
information they gather” (Garrouste 2003, p. 305). This kind of learning is similar to Bateson’s 
(1972) learning 0: An automatic learning that does not imply any cognitive change in the 
representation systems. 
But it seems difficult to speak about process, for the changes appear instantaneously, in the 
absence of dialogue as well as introspection. Besides, and it is quite a paradox, this learning 
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model tends to reduce to its simplest terms the agent’s cognitive dimension, suppressing the 
deliberation step proposed by Walliser. Garrouste (1999, p.  141) evokes the idea of a 
“maximizator automaton”, whereas Dibbiagio (1999, p.  121) speaks about a “Pavlovian 
decision process of stimuli-response style”. 
 
Learning: a march towards perfect rationality? 
If the concept of perfect rationality is not adapted to describe the behavior during learning, it 
may be integrated to learning models as a long term perspective. The idea proposed by several 
economists is that perfect rationality models may help to understand, not the real behavior of 
agents, but where learning tends to push them. Learning in this sense would be analyzed as a 
“march toward perfect rationality”.
4 
This perspective open the path for an ex post justification of the perfect rationality assumption. 
But these “foundations” are still problematic. If learning is a march toward rationality, it means 
that as soon as perfect rationality is obtained, individuals do not learn anymore. In other words, 
the learning notion, which is supposed to found the theoretical hypothesis of perfect rationality, 
is in contradiction with that assumption. Either individuals learn, or they are perfectly rational. 
In a more fundamental way, the idea that individuals may become progressively rational means 
that it is possible to understand the rationality acquisition as a cumulative process. Yet, by 
definition, there is only one way to be rational. Thinking that it is possible to rank individuals 
in respect to their learning level, that is to their rationality degree, is very troublesome. On 
which criteria shall we determine that such agent is behaving in a “more” or “less” rational way 
than another? Because rationality is a binary concept, it seems very difficult to use it in order to 
describe an evolving process. 
Finally, this approach of learning is very linear. Learning, in this conception, is seen as an 
objective process that would help the representations of an individual to get closer to the 
“reality” of the world. In other terms, only one kind of learning model would exist, and there 
would be only one optimal behavior to converge. The idea of mistake in learning is taken off 
the analysis. 
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3. Learning and bounded rationality 
In economics, evolutionary models, which take into account the learning notion especially in a 
social or organizational context (Levitt and March 1988, Dosi et al. 2003), were the first to 
fully integrate the notion of bounded rationality. This interest was partly due to the fact that the 
evolutionary logic is based on a principle of diversity, which necessitates going away from a 
mere “homo economicus” conception. 
Simon believed that the rationality models of individuals have to be founded on an empirical 
basis and must be compatible with the ones that are used in other social sciences. More 
precisely, Simon notes that “in economics, rationality is viewed in terms of the choices it 
produces; in the other social sciences, it is viewed in terms of the processes it employs” (Simon 
1986, p. 210). Simon proposes therefore a process-based rationality, which he calls “procedural 
rationality”, as opposed to economists’ “substantive rationality”. This approach is set up on the 
idea that individuals do not base their choices from to the world as it objectively is, but from 
their subjective perception of it. 
This observation does not mean that individuals act irrationally. Rubinstein (1998, p.  21) 
emphasises the “strategic” aspect of procedural rationality and distinguishes it from an 
“impulsive” action that would characterize irrationality. Similarly, for Simon, “everyone agrees 
that people have reasons for what they do” (Simon 1986, p. 209). In other words, talking about 
“bounded rationality” only means that rational actions are taken in the specific context of 
particular representations: 
If […] we accept the proposition that both the knowledge and the computational power of the 
decision maker are severely limited, then we must distinguish between the real world and the 
actor’s perception of it and reasoning about it. That is to say, we must construct a theory (and test it 
empirically) of the processes of decision. Our theory must include not only the reasoning processes 
but also the processes that generate the actor’s subjective representation of the decision problem, his 
or her frame (Ibid., p. 211). 
Going deeper into Simon’s reasoning with Walliser’s typology, we find that the agent’s 
rationality is not only bounded in the way the agent makes decisions based on the knowledge it 
has (bounded in its instrumental rationality), but also on the knowledge and the perception it 
has of the world (bounded in its cognitive rationality). 
With this distinction, two kinds of learning can therefore occur. A first kind of learning may be 
developed in order to improve the cognitive content of representations, by observation and by 
confrontation with reality. By acquiring information and knowledge, an individual may   7
improve its representation models and may take its knowledge closer to the real state of its 
environment. A second kind of learning can be developed in order to improve the agent’s 
instrumental rationality. In this second type of learning, the individual does not try to change 
the way it understands its environment, but aims to improve the procedures that guide its 
choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These two kinds of learning are, of course, complementary. The procedures of action are, as a 
matter of fact, largely dependant from the level of knowledge. Similarly, a change in the 
decision procedures of an individual may lead him to behave differently, and may help to 
develop a cognitive learning from the new experiences it is confronted with. 
 
Limits of the bounded rationality model in the study of learning 
While the Simonian model of rationality seems to fit better for the study of learning 
phenomena than the neoclassical model, it has however a number of limits. 
The first one is related to the way procedures are revised. For Simon, as for Nelson and Winter, 
it is the “satisfacing” criterion that is put forward. Instead of trying to maximize its utility, the 
agent tries to reach an objective that it believes is “satisfying”, and will change its behavior 
only if this objective is not attained. The question then raised is what kind of learning an agent 
must develop in case of an “unsatisfying” result. Does it have to change the deepest procedures 
(or routines) that determine its behavior, or is it possible to carry out only marginal changes? 
How will it understand the causes of its failure? 
Simon is not very clear in the answers he offers to these questions. The example that he gives 
on the coordination of the American help during the Marshall Plan (Simon 1996, p. 141-143) is 
very revealing about Simon’s argument and its limits. Let’s briefly recall the problem. When 
the American government decided to engage a first $5.3 billion help in order to restore the 
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Fig. 1: Two kinds of learning in bounded rationality   8
postwar economy of European nations in 1948, a special agency was created to coordinate this 
help, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Following Simon, the agency actions 
could have been implemented through six different conceptions, and could answer to six 
different objectives, most of them being contradictory with the others.
5 At its beginning, each 
conception was present in the agency, but it would have been inconceivable to follow all of 
them without ruining the coherence of the American policy towards Europe. Finally, Simon 
says that after a year of functioning, a common representation emerged in the agency “as it 
evolved”. 
But this example appears to be more in contradiction than in support of Simon’s view. Simon 
defends the idea that an adaptive process, by feedback, is superior to a planned process that 
would be oriented towards final objectives. He gives two reasons for that: First, an adaptive 
process allows us to keep a maximum of options open for our future choices (Ibid., p. 167); 
second, only this kind of evolution is compatible with our limited capacity to foretell the 
consequences of our decisions (Ibid., p. 163). Yet, in the Marshall Plan example, it is precisely 
the lack of a clear vision that “almost” (Simon says) “create thorough confusion in the agency 
and among its clients” (Ibid., p. 143). 
In a nutshell, if you follow Simon’s example, it would have been necessary to coordinate from 
the beginning the American help in order to reach one of the six possible objectives, escaping 
the confusion that may imperil the project; but you follow his argument, it was on the contrary 
necessary to organize the American help in the most flexible way, in order not to be trapped in 
a unique representation that would prevent the progressive adaptation of the Marshall Plan to 
the “reality” of the field. 
Let’s go on with three remarks. The first one is that the logic that says that feedback adaptive 
mechanisms are more efficient than planned processes is a logic that looks very much like the 
optimization logic, which Simon rejects. Indeed, if the goal is not to find the “best” possible 
organization, but only to select a satisfying one, then any one of the six representations would 
be sufficient to implement the Marshall plan.
6 The second remark is related to the Simonian 
implicit hypothesis, which assumes that the conception to follow will spontaneously emerge 
from the confrontation with the “real things”. This hypothesis seems very much debatable and 
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has never been proved. At last, the third remark is related to the ambiguous character of the 
environmental feedbacks. An adaptive mechanism is efficient (or even possible), only if clear 
feedbacks, without any ambiguity, are received by the adaptive system. As soon as the 
environmental feedbacks are open to interpretations or misunderstanding, the system can no 
longer objectively adapt itself to its environment. This difficulty is even more important if we 
consider that the feedback interpretation depends on the representations that have been 
adopted. In this case, it is impossible that a structure, which brings together different 
individuals, acting in relation to incompatible representations and objectives, may be able to 
spontaneously define a common adaptive process. Even if the environment and the problems 
are the same, they will not be perceived as such. The capacity for agents to agree on a common 
representation is therefore weakened, instead of strengthened, by the confrontation with reality, 
as long as everyone find, in the experience, a validation of its own interpretative frameworks. 
To sum up, in order to understand how a learning process is being carried out, one needs to 
understand how an organization or an individual is lead to choose one representation or 
objective instead of another. In fact, in order to escape the ambiguity of a “non-choice”, it may 
be better to start from a subjective a priori instead of trying to adapt to the field “reality”. 
Learning will therefore follows a “bet” logic, in which the path to go is chosen ex ante. 
Adopting this approach in the study of learning implies that the need for the coherence of the 
process is more important than the need for the optimization of a behavior to a given 
environment. This perspective radically change, as we’re going to see now, the view Simon 
adopted in his study of behavior. 
 
Are learning processes intentional? 
The Simonian analysis of behavior and learning is based on the refusal of a teleological 
explanation. In fact, Simon disregards the subjective and intentional parts of behaviors, and 
this makes him analyze human behavior like the one of a computer or of an ant. The three 
following quotations are very revealing as such: 
“As we succeed in broadening and deepening our knowledge […] about computers, we discover 
that in large part their behavior is governed by simple general laws, that what appeared as 
complexity in the computer program was to a considerable extent complexity of the environment to 
which the program was seeking to adapt its behavior” (Simon 1996, p. 21).   10
“An ant, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent complexity of its behavior over 
time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which it finds itself” (Ibid., p. 
52). 
“Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple. The apparent complexity of our 
behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which we find 
ourselves” (Ibid., p. 53). 
This explicit parallel between human behavior and the one of an ant or of a computer leads us 
to two consequences. 
The first one is that the Simonian model assumes that reality is objectively perceived, so the 
agents’ behaviors are the direct consequence of the real state of the environment they face. In 
other words, even if there are limits to their sensorial capacities, there are no systematic 
cognitive biases in the way individuals see their environment. As a consequence, for Simon, 
human beings behave like an ant, because the representation systems upon which they use to 
act are not the product of a choice or of an intention, but are directly made of what they see of a 
world that they cannot comprehend globally. Therefore, the same kinds of behaviors and the 
same kinds of learning will be adopted by different agents, as long as they are involved in 
similar situations. The more they face the “field” experience, the more individuals learn and 
improve their representation systems. These representations will then have the tendency to 
converge, getting closer and closer to “reality”. 
The conclusion is very different if learning is considered as a process that starts from a “bet”, 
and whose coherence is given, not by the objective state of the environment, but by an 
individual and subjective choice that is made ex ante. In this case, agents learn while keeping a 
personal coherence over time. This implies that similar individuals will not learn the same 
thing, even if they are confronted with the same environment, because they will not interpret 
the field experience in the same way. Learning will then not lead representations to converge, 
but may help, on the contrary, to maintain, or even to deepen individual differences. 
The second consequence is related to the way learning procedures are changed. Simon sees 
them as universal and believes that they are imposed upon the behaving systems. So when it 
needs to revise its behavior in order to face a new situation, the ant only follows other 
procedures that are, ultimately, parts of its genetic heritage. An ant neither thinks nor 
deliberates; it is programmed to follow a certain change instead of another. Unless you change 
its genetic heritage, you cannot change the way an ant learns.   11
This statement seems however much less obvious for a human being, for it implements a 
conscious action when it decides to undertake a certain kind of learning instead of another. As 
such, it always keeps some control of what it learns. Unlike the ant, it may intentionally break 
the learning process in which it is engaged, and decide to change its representative schemes. So 
the way an individual learns does not come down to a system of simple rules, exogenously 
given, but implies a choice that has been ex ante defined. 
Taking into account these two consequences necessitates enriching the Simonian model by 
adopting another rationality representation that would be compatible with the ideas of intention 
and choice in the learning process. This is what we aim to do in the following section. 
 
4. Intentionality and identity in learning 
As it was said before, Simon founds his theory of rational behavior on a system of procedures 
made from environmental feedbacks, and under the constraint of the system cognitive and 
perception abilities. In regard to cognitive sciences, Simonian approach is called 
“computationist” (Paulré 2005) or “cognitivist” (Varela 1997). It is based on the assumption 
that the human brain, like the cognitive system of an ant, or like a computer program, is an 
information processing system that works sequentially, and that uses items (or symbols), which 
represent elements of the environment. This approach implies the following assumptions: 
  1/ Learning is assimilated to a memorization process (Simon 1996, chap. 4) that can 
only accumulate two sorts of items: Either some information data about the state of the world, 
which will help to enrich the representation system; or computing capacities, through the 
memorizations of complex links between items. This will help simplifying calculations by 
developing what Simon calls an intuition (Simon 1996, p. 89-90). 
  2/ Learning procedures are universal since they are based on a cognitive activity that is 
reduced to simple logical operations. If a system behaves (or learns) differently from another, it 
is only because the objective characteristics of their environments are different, or because the 
two systems do not have the same cognitive or sensorial abilities. 
  3/ Simon believes that the human memory (and therefore learning) is organized into 
fundamental elements (chunks), each of them representing one dimension of the received 
information (a stimulus). The knowledge of an individual therefore corresponds to the whole   12
chunks that were previously memorized.
7 This conception in which memory is made of 
partitioned information data does not fit very with the idea of tacit knowledge.
8 
Our assumption is that this conception of learning is far too restrictive. It does not take into 
account the intentional dimension of the action of learning, and the choices that this action 
necessitates. The goal of this section is then to enrich the Simonian rationality model and to 
propose a more complex analysis of human learning phenomena. In the next subsection, the 
cognitive approaches of Simon and Varela will be analyzed. Then, a “subjective” view of 
rationality will be developed before we show, in the last subsection, the role and the 
importance of coherence and identity in learning. 
 
4.1. An alternative approach of cognitive sciences 
Cognitive sciences can be defined as the study of the relation between the brain, the mind and 
the behavior of thinking beings. This relatively new science (Varela 1997 speaks of 1940 as its 
birth date) is founded on the one hand on the rejection of the behaviorist argument, and on the 
other hand on the assumption that it is possible to study cognitive activities as such, leaving 
aside the biological functioning of the brain. 
The Simonian cognitivist paradigm corresponds to the social sciences “orthodoxy”, as it 
emerged in the MIT research centers in the 50s. Since then however, new approaches were 
developed and other theoretical frameworks were invented, like the “connexionist” approach 
that came out in the 70s. The funding assumption of connectionism is that cognitive systems do 
not work sequentially, treating discrete symbols that represent concrete elements of reality, but 
react globally to external stimuli. In a connexionist cognitive system, knowledge is not 
localized, but depends on the global structure of the system, and the cognitive unit does not 
process the information data the one after the other but in parallel, each datum contributing to 
transform the whole architecture. The cognitive system is therefore considered as a self-
organized dynamic network, in which each part is in coherence with the others. 
The connexionist paradigm allows taking into account some mental phenomena that are 
neglected in the cognitivist approach. First, it can comprehend the tacit dimension of learning. 
Memory, in that conception, is not considered as a tank of symbolic items that represent 
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concrete elements of the world, but as a “sub-symbolic” system, whose meaning is written into 
the interactions of the elements instead of into the elements themselves (Varela 1997, p. 79). 
Some knowledge may therefore be diluted in the global organization of the cognitive system, 
or may be in an exclusive interaction with others (association principle). 
The second interest of the connexionist paradigm is to emphasize interpretation phenomena. In 
the connexionist models, human perception is considered to work in relation with the whole 
cognitive system, instead of in isolation. Varela (1997, p. 73-75) shows for example that the 
vision processing unit is less influenced by the optic nerve stimuli, than by the rest of the brain 
activity. Consequently, information is transformed (i.e. interpreted) while it is perceived, since 
the optic nerve contributes only in minority to the vision processing system. 
Another model that challenges the cognitivist principles is the enaction approach, which is 
proposed by Varela. This approach is compatible with the connexionist paradigm and aims to 
extend it. Its central assumption is that it is possible to study the cognitive processes without 
the  representation notion. In fact, Varela considers that cognitive sciences have a very 
occidental conception of the relations between the world and the mind. Most cognitive 
scientists adopt the dualist view, in which two separated and distinct entities exist: the mind, 
which “conceive”, and the world, which “is”. In this view, knowledge is only the expression of 
a “mirror of nature”. The world is predetermined and learning is restricted to an accumulation 
of information data that corresponds to real proprieties of it. 
On the contrary, in Varela’s approach, the relations between the world and the mind are 
circular. The world properties are not predefined but “enacted”, they are the product of action. 
In other words, there is no “pure” perception, every one of them being directed by an intention. 
The Varela’s intentionality conception follows the “Intentionality” notion of John Searle 
(1983). It designates the capacity of the mind to get the organism connected with the world. To 
put it differently, it is because it has an intention that an individual is able to direct its actions 
or its perception toward an actual or possible object. 
To sum up, in the enaction approach, the human brain does not only answer predefined 
questions, as a computer would, but is able to define its own environment: “the most important 
faculty of every living cognition is precisely, in a large extent, to ask the pertinent questions 
that arise at any time in our life. They are not predefined but enacted, they are being emerged 
on a background, and the pertinence criterions are given by our common sense, in a way that is 
always contextual” (Varela 1997, p. 91).   14
 
The enaction theory, which is proposed by Varela in order to comprehend the cognitive 
phenomena, deeply changes the way rationality and learning are conceived. The main change 
deals with the “creative” aspect of human cognition. While learning is limited to a 
memorization process that aims to adapt the organism to a given reality for Simon, Varela 
views learning as a construction that emerges in the relationship between the individual and its 
environment. A color or a smell are not the objective products of nature, but emerge in the 
perception, that individuals have of them.
9 
The enaction approach does not contradict the connexionist models but open the cognitive 
sciences to new questions. The first one deals with the questioning of the notion of 
information. Traditionally, information is seen as an objective property of the environment that 
would be assimilated (cognitivist paradigm) or interpreted (connexionist paradigm) by the 
system during the learning. On the contrary, for Varela, information is nothing else than a 
“modern phlogiston” (Ibid., p. 11-12). It exists only when it is seen. As he says: “information is 
not pre-established as an intrinsic order, but […] corresponds to regularities that emerge from 
the cognitive activities themselves” (Varela 1997, p. 122). 
In this view, learning has to be considered as a process that integrates the rules for its own 
organization. Learning does not mean acquiring information chaotically, but to create an order. 
In other words, knowledge forms a structure and not only a stock. To take Langlois and 
Garrouste’s words: “Knowledge is not a stock in the same sense that oil in a tank is a stock, 
something modified in a purely quantitatively way by the inflow or outflow of info-fluid. […] 
Knowledge is about structure » (Langlois et Garrouste 1997, p. 288). Therefore, to learn means 
both to reorganize the structure of existing knowledge, and to acquire some new knowledge. So 
there is a difference in kind between what is received (the stimulus), and what is understood, 
that is between the message, which comes form outside and the knowledge, which is a 
subjective and partial organization of it. As Nooteboom (2005, p. 37) points out, “information is 
not the same as knowledge […] To become knowledge, information needs to be interpreted and 
understood in a cognitive framework”. 
The second question that arises from Valera’s approach deals with the role of the individual and 
its subjectivity in the way it learns. As we showed before, the Simonian cognitivist approach 
assumes that thinking beings (whether they are human or ant), will always behave in a similar 
                                                 
9 “Like colors, smells are not revealed through a passive function of external properties, but through the creative 
articulation of a meaning that comes from history” (Varela 1997 p. 111).   15
way, trying to adapt themselves, in the best way they can, to their environment. The idea on 
which is based the enaction approach is on the contrary that the world that is perceived is not 
independent from whom perceives. Here is what Varela writes in the preface of the second 
edition of his book: 
“One of the lead of this book is that ordinary life necessarily implies embodied agents, who are 
continuously confronted to the problem of action, whereas their different sensory-motor systems are 
engaged in parallel activities. […] The corporality implies that the cognitive entity has – by 
definition – a perspective. It means that its links with the environment are not “objective”, 
independent from the situation, from attitudes and from the system history. On the contrary, these 
links are closely related to the perspective established by properties that keep emerging from the 
agent itself, and to the role played by these redefining in the coherence of the whole system” 
(Varela 1997, p. iii). 
In other words, the adapting process works first in relation with an intention (which he calls the 
“perspective” of the cognitive system) that finds its origin in the many dimensions of the 
individual itself, in its history, its mental universe, its “corporality”, or in what we could more 
simply call its identity. 
 
4.2. A new relation between learning and rationality 
Bertrand Russel gave in 1954 the following definition of reason: “It signifies the choice of the 
right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of 
ends” (Russell 1954, p. 8). Russel’s comments aim to define rationality in order to favour the 
relation between means and ends, and to keep it from a too normative aspect. Indeed for Russel, 
the rationality criterion does not refer to a particular behavior, but to a logic of coherence 
between the behavior and the agent’s own finalities. It has to be said that this conception of 
rationality is not contradictory with the neoclassical or Simonian conceptions, in which there are 
adequacy between means and end (even if the former is based on optimization while the second 
restricts itself to the “satisfacing” criterion). 
Let’s now consider learning. In Simon’s view, as well as in the neoclassical model, learning is 
“substantive”. There is in fact only one way to learn, the one that consists in memorizing true 
information about the world properties. But in the enaction approach, many different ways of 
learning are possible. The way you learn, the kind of data you memorize, depends on the 
perspective you choose. Learning becomes a creative activity, whose norms and frames are 
guided by the specific intention of the system. Paraphrasing Russel, a rational learning may then 
be defined in the following way:   16
Rational learning signifies the choice of the right knowledge accumulation to an 
intention you wish to adopt. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of 
intentions. 
In other words, being rational in learning does not mean accumulating objective information 
data in a universal logical process, but deepening an intention that was subjectively 
determined. 
Simon showed that two rational human beings will not necessarily behave in the same way, 
even if their objectives are identical, because they do not have the same view of the world. He 
implicitly assumed, however, that the way they learn would be similar. We therefore suggest to 
enlarge the Simon’s initial intuition about behavior, considering that, even in learning, the 
rationality criterion does not refer to an essence of learning, but to a principle of coherence 
between what is learned and what was intended to deepen. 
 
4.3. Identity as the driving force of learning 
Learning processes are based both on equilibrium and on evolution principles (Cayla 2008). In 
fact, if changes in the cognitive system are necessarily for learning, accumulation is also one of 
its mains characteristic. This accumulation implies that a learning process has to maintain the 
stability of the knowledge that was previously acquired. 
In the cognitivist approach, knowledge is seen as a stock of memorized information. As a 
consequence, learning is obviously cumulative since the volume of information increases as the 
system perceives new environmental feedbacks. In the enaction approach however, it is the 
system’s intentionality that gives a sense to external stimuli. Any change in this intentionality 
may therefore call into question the acquired knowledge; it is then important to preserve it, in 
such a way that the learning process can go on. 
 
Learning and coherence 
Unlike Simon’s argument, the learning processes have to be considered, not as a mere 
mechanism that adapts itself to environmental conditions, but as internal and complex 
processes that are continuously torn between their needs for internal coherence and the 
necessity for them to be flexible. This approach implies changing the angle of the analysis in a 
way to focus not only on environmental signals, but also on the internal mechanisms of   17
response (Marengo 1995). Therefore, cognitive learning processes have to deal with two 
antinomic constraints. On the one hand they have to let the organism developing a knowledge 
system that is appropriate to its environment; on the other hand, they must not affect the 
coherence that both maintains the acquired knowledge and allows accumulating some new 
learning. Dibiaggio (1999, p. 119) emphasizes that learning may take the shape of a coherence 
“repairing process” that restores the cognitive system. Such a process implies an introspective 
work of learning that aims to realign the nature of acquired knowledge with the specific 
intentionality and identity of the individual. 
It has to be said that the adapting processes and the coherence repairing processes are two 
kinds of complementary learning. If coherence is not maintained, the organism is unable to 
assimilate and to give a sense to new knowledge. So the adapting process of the cognitive 
system should not be considered as an objective learning about the environment, but as a 
deepening process of the agent’s intention about its environment. 
The figure 2 bellow completes our representation of learning forms. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The notion of identity 
The last question that we have to answer deals with the way the perspective of the cognitive 
system evolves. As we have said, the organism learns from an intentionality that helps it to 
acquire knowledge in a coherent way. But this intentionality may also change, according to an 
internal evolution, or in order to adapt the organism’s knowledge to a change in its 
environment. 
A way to conceive this change is to study the relation between behavior, knowledge and 
identity. The identity concept has been studied in numerous works in economy (Akerlof and 
Fig.: Extended representation of forms of learning 
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Kranton 2000, 2005; John Davis, 2003). The French Revue de philosophie économique devoted 
one of its special issues to this subject, among whom Kirman and Teshle, Alban Bouvier, 
Pierre Livet, John Davis, Amartya Sen, and Philip Grill contributed. 
Thus, Akerlof and Kranton emphasize the importance of the identity notion in economy: 
“Because identity is fundamental to behavior, choice of identity may be the most important 
‘economic’ decision people make” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, p. 717). But in order to be 
“economic”, identity must be influenced by economic decisions, that is by conscious acts. The 
question is then to know whether agents have or not the freedom to “choose” their identity. 
Sen’s answer to this question is that the notion of identity is in contradiction with the choice 
axiom, which is fundamental in economy: “We ‘discover’ rather than choose our identity” (Sen 
2004, p. 10). 
Another question raised by the notion of identity is that it calls into question the assumption of 
the stability of preferences. If the identity of an individual changes, one may expect this 
individual to re-evaluate the utility of its actions. This approach takes us away from the homo 
economicus model, and implies that economists must study more closely the social and 
psychological roots of human behavior (Kirman and Teschl 2004, Sen 2004, Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005). 
At last, accepting that the identity of an individual may change according to psychological or 
social criterions may endanger the very notion of “identity”. How can an evolving person stay 
“identical” to himself? For Davis, it is precisely the notion of identity that helps to comprehend 
the “personal continuously” of an individual, the fact that an individual can stay “the same” 
while he changes as the same time. This view is also adopted by Kirman and Teschl, who 
consider that the notion of identity goes beyond the question of preferences. Preferences have 
not to be considered as exogenous and unchanging, but must be seen as progressing within the 
framework of a constructing identity, so that individuals “follow a certain path” (Kirman and 
Techl 2004).
10 
If we adopt this view of identity, the way an individual changes its cognitive perspective and 
revises its intentions is internalized. The relationship between identity and intentionality can be 
specified following Grill’s study of the concept of identity. Grill rejects both the essentialist 
                                                 
10 “We might consider homo economicus as an agent who wants to do things and who is able to influence the 
world. The economic agent creates, builds, changes, and learns, is self-reflexive and evaluates her actions. She 
consciously affects and changes not only the conditions of life but also her own self-perception, thus her personal 
features and attitudes” (Kirman et Teschl 2004, p. 62). 
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and the existentialist views of identity and suggests adopting a “pragmatic” perspective. He 
then defines identity as the capacity for a person to self-designate. But this self-designation is 
not given once and for all, and is not independent from the social environment. It is constructed 
in a process that helps an individual to give a sense to its own actions, trying to “gather its life 
under the form of a story” (Grill 2004, p.  90). So identity is not predetermined. It is not 
discovered as Sen argued, but it is “conquered” (Ibid. p. 94). It emerges like a life’s work 
(Ibid.), through the story the individual gives himself. 
This view of identity supports our analysis of intentionality. Grill notably emphasizes that “life 
cannot be reified to a mere collection of behaviors and, to have a meaning, each action must be 
articulated with the life of the one who undertakes it. Actions may not be analyzed separately. 
They must be analyzed in relation with their coherence, in the person’s process of self-
constitution” (Ibid. p. 95). In other words, if intentionality is defined as the relationship that an 
individual develops with its environment and on the basis of which he constructs his cognitive 
system, then identity can be defined as the relationship that an individual develops with himself 
and on the basis of which he creates his own intentionality. As the existence of an intention 
allows the individual to interpret and comprehend its sensorial stimuli, “by telling himself a 
story and by interpreting his experiences, the individual discovers and reveals his own identity” 
(Ibid. p. 96). 
We can now develop a global analysis of the learning process, by distinguishing three 
overlapping and hierarchical levels that may help to comprehend the working of a cognitive 
system (figure 3). 
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knowledge itself is constructed according to a desired or future action. We find again the 
Varela’s view of enaction, which postulates that action and cognition mutually defined 
themselves. 
A level above, the “circle of cognition”, represents the system’s cognitive learning. This type 
of learning is connected with an intention, which helps to organize the knowledge as a coherent 
and individualized structure instead of a stock of objective information data. Here again, 
knowledge and intentionality codetermine themselves. Knowledge is partially the product of 
intention, whereas intentionality is also a construction that is based on the individual’s 
knowledge and on the way he looks at his own actions. 
At last, the third level, the “circle of identity” expresses the deeper learning level, the one that 
helps the individual to “see” himself. With the construction of his identity, the individual 
builds his intentions, and it is with his intentions and through the way he sees himself, that his 
identity is built. 
This representation is interesting because it clearly assumes two fundamental ideas. First, it is 
based on the idea that they are no frozen level and that the whole cognitive organization of an 
individual may change. Second, it shows hierarchical aspect of this organization and the fact 
that a change in one of theses levels does not involve the same kind of learning in any case. A 
change in the relationship between knowledge and behavior (an instrumental level) will less 
destabilize the cognitive structure than a change in the relationship between intentionality and 
identity. The big question is then to understand how the individual learns, how he adapts 
himself to his environment and to himself, by making use of these three types of possible 
learning.
11 
 
5. Conclusion 
Learning means two quite different things. For most economists, it means to bring knowledge 
progressively closer to a given reality. Thanks to learning, I can acquire information that 
completes and improves my representation system, which tends to be a mirror that will be 
smoother and smoother, and that will better and better reflect my environment. Although this 
approach of learning has the advantage to be compatible with the neoclassical and Simonian 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that these three cognitive levels are related to Bateson’s (1972) three level of learning. 
Interestingly, Bateson notice that learning III involves a “deep reorganization of one’s character” and that it may 
call into question the individual’s definition of himself.   21
rationality models, it seems inadequate to comprehend learning phenomena for at least three 
reasons: 
  1/ it cannot conceive learning as a process, that is as an ordered succession of steps that 
has its own logic. Instead, learning is simply reduced to a chaotic information data 
accumulation. 
  2/ it cannot comprehend learning as the product of a choice and of a personal 
subjectivity. Learning comes down to a linear improvement of the performances of the 
relationship between the individual and its environment. Even if it is hard to say that 
everybody learns the same thing (agents do not belong to the same environment) at the same 
speed (they do not perform identically in learning), they learn in the same way, by memorizing 
the objective data that are given by their environment. 
  3/ the problems related to the convergence or to the coordination of learning by 
different persons are assume to be inexistent. When different agents are confronted to the same 
environment, they are supposed to learn the same thing. As a consequence, their cognitive 
diversity is supposed to decrease as their knowledge of the world is increasing. This 
assumption is especially problematic if one wants to study collective or organisational learning, 
in which coordination problems are the core of the analysis. 
In this paper, we choose to try another approach that defines learning as the guided 
development of a cognitive system, instead of as an accumulation of “true” information. In our 
view, learning does not bring knowledge closer to an objective reality, but aims to deepen the 
progression of a cognitive system in its own reality. This implies that there is no “pure” and 
unequivocal information. Thus, if I learn, I will not construct a mirror that will reflect the 
environment with more and more faithfulness, but I will establish a partial and subjective view 
of it. 
This second approach of learning solves the difficulties of the first one but has two important 
consequences. 
1/ first, learning of two different individuals will not make them converge toward the 
same representation system, and to learn will not help them to understand each other better. 
Learning processes may on the contrary increase their divergence, because they will not learn 
the same thing from the same stimulus. As a consequence, individual learning may destabilize 
a social organization.   22
2/ the second consequence of this approach of learning deals with the rationality model 
that has to be adopted. In this paper, we showed that there is not only one rational learning 
model, but many of them, for what matters in learning is the level of coherence between the 
learning process and the individual’s intentionality and identity. Learning in this meaning 
resemble to the product of an internal and complex system that is continuously torn between its 
needs for internal coherence and the necessity it has to adapt to its environment. 
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